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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
In Appellee's Brief, Teresa Guss ("Guss") recites the allegations in |^ 9 of the First 
Amended Complaint that each of the defendants, Cheryl, Inc. ("Cheryl") and Derek 
Edvalson (ccDerek") were negligent. (Record ("R.") 36-42) Guss does not, however, 
describe the allegation in [^ 8 of the First Amended Complaint that when Guss was 
leaving Cheryl's premises, "Derek Edvalson, acting for and on behalf of Cheryl, Inc., 
attempted to pick up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her vehicle." This 
allegation of vicarious liability summarizes Guss's claims against Cheryl. 
In the Appellee's Brief, Guss provides an incomplete description of the reasons 
Cheryl moved for summary judgment. In the memoranda supporting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Cheryl moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) there 
was no evidence that Cheryl caused Guss's injury, even if Derek was subject to liability, 
since Cheryl was not Derek's employer and Cheryl's owner and employees were not 
assisting Guss at the time of the injury; and (2) Cheryl could not be held vicariously 
liable tor a Derek's negligence as a volunteer and the fact that a parent-child relationship 
between Cheryl's principal and Derek did not subject Cheryl to vicarious liability. (R. 
52-152). 
In the Appellee's Brief, Guss cites arguments in her memorandum opposing 
Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment that Cheryl was "independently negligent" and 
that Cheryl was subject to liability "irrespective of his employment relationship." 
Although Guss did not cite any supporting authority, nor explicitly argue, that Cheryl was 
subject to primary and direct liability for asking a volunteer to assist Guss, the trial court 
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rejected any argument other than vicarious liability to deny summary judgment. 
Specifically, the sole reason that the trial court denied summary judgment was that "this 
is a factual question for the jury to determine whether the son is a volunteer helping his 
mother in her business and, therefore, the business should be liable, or could be liable." 
(R. 925). 
Guss argues that "no instruction discussed any consequence of finding Derek to be 
a volunteer." After the district court's order denying summary judgment for the sole 
reason that a jury would have to decide the fact question whether Derek was a volunteer, 
and after Guss's settlement with Derek a week before trial, Guss should have known that 
a finding by the jury that Derek was a volunteer would mean that the claims against 
Cheryl would be dismissed. There cannot be any dispute that Guss knew Cheryl would 
seek dismissal of all claims, if the jury found that Derek was a volunteer, since Cheryl 
began closing argument by seeking relief under Interrogatory No. 6. In Appellee's Brief, 
Guss contends that it has reviewed the citation to the record in Appellant's Brief to 
confirm that Cheryl "made no reference to Derek's status as a volunteer barring recovery 
against Cheryl." This contention is absolutely wrong. 
The Special Verdict had seven questions, including Interrogatory No. 6, which 
provided as follows: 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a 
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that defendant, Derek 
Edvalson, was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer. 
Employee 
Volunteer X 
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Beginning with the second sentence of Cheryl's closing argument and continuing 
through the sixth sentence Cheryl specifically discussed Interrogatory No 6 and the 
dispositive effect of a finding that Deiek was a volunteer, as follows 
[Y]ou cannot allow someone to keep suing for helping the disabled 
we've got to encourage people to help the disabled, if it's not your job, 
that's the key thing here Derek was not doing his job 
You'll see on the special verdict that you're going to be given the 
question halfway through, which again is more than half-way through, 
two-thirds of the way thiough, which is going to seem out of place, that's 
got negligence, cause, negligence, cause, for each of the parties and then it 
asks you to determine from the preponderance of the evidence whether 
Derek Edvalson was an employee or a volunteer Why9 
Well, because if you help the disabled as an employee for work, 
you'd better know what you're doing If you're doing it as an act of 
kindness, you should not be sued if something goes wrong 
(R 952, Volume 3 of the Trial Transcript 516-17) 
Guss did not object to Cheryl's explanation to the jury in closing argument of the 
effect of a finding that Derek was a volunteer Pnoi to trial, Cheryl submitted 
Interrogatory No 6 as part of its proposed Special Verdict form (R 676-749) Guss did 
not submit any proposed instructions or Special Verdict which described the effect of a 
finding m Interrogatory No 6 that Derek was a volunteer Guss did not object to the jury 
instructions and Special Verdict submitted by Cheryl before trial that omitted an 
explanation of the effect of Interrogatory No 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The only reason that Cheryl was not dismissed by summary judgment was that the 
district court held that the jury was lequired to determine the factual question of whether 
Derek was a volunteer In filing the motion to revise the order denying the motion for 
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summary judgment, Cheryl justifiably relied on Interrogatory No. 6, which decided in 
Cheryl's favor the only unresolved issue used to deny the summary judgment motion. 
The trial court's order denying the motion to revise the summary judgment meant that the 
trial court disregarded and nullified the finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a 
volunteer. 
Guss has not cited any authority supporting her theory that a party who requests 
thai a non-employee assist a customer into her car subjects the requester to liability. 
Allegations that Derek had been improperly trained, or that a business which asks an 
employee, family member, or bystander to assist a customer cannot deny any 
responsibility for a negative outcome, do not entitle Guss to judgment against Cheryl. 
Cheryl submitted Interrogatory No. 6 based on the trial court's order denying the 
summary judgment motion. Interrogatory No. 6 uses words with plain meanings that do 
not require further definition. In the event that Guss contends that the meaning of 
Interrogatory No. 6 required further description or definition, it was obligated to object to 
Interrogatory No. 6 or to submit additional jury instructions. 
The district court and Guss did not offer any reasonable explanation for the reason 
that Interrogatory No. 6 was included in the Special Verdict if the district court intended 
to enter the same judgment against Cheryl, regardless of whether Derek was found to be 
an employee or volunteer. At trial, Cheryl had no reason to object to the Special Verdict, 
since the trial court had not defeated the effect of Interrogatory No. 6. Based upon the 
order denying summary judgment and the decision to include Interrogatory No. 6 in the 
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Special Verdict, the trial court did not have the prerogative to disregard and nullify the 
finding that Derek was a volunteer. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE VERDICT FOUND THREE PERSONS WERE NEGLIGENT, 
BUT THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE RULE 54(b) 
MOTION WHOLLY DISREGARDED AND NULLIFIED THE 
FINDING THAT DEREK WAS A VOLUNTEER. 
In Argument I of the Appellee's Brief, Guss argues that, because the verdict found 
that two parties and a non-party were negligent, the motion filed by Cheryl on March 16, 
2009, to revise the decision denying summary judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
(the "54(b) Motion"), was Cheryl's attempt to disrupt the verdict. By filing the 54(b) 
Motion, however, Cheryl sought just the opposite result. Specifically, the 54(b) Motion 
requested that the trial court ensure the jury's finding in Interrogatory No. 6 was not 
wholly disregarded and nullified in the final judgment. In addition, Cheryl was required 
to submit Interrogatory No. 6 to the jury in accordance with the district court's order 
denying summary judgment, since the court ruled that the sole reason it denied Cheryl's 
dispositive motion was that there was a "factual question for the jury to determine" 
whether Derek was a volunteer. In Interrogatory No. 6, the jury determined this factual 
question in favor of Cheryl by finding that Derek was a volunteer, but in denying the 
54(b) Motion the trial court refused to give effect to the jury's finding. 
When Cheryl filed the Motion for Summary Judgment almost two years before 
trial, Cheryl contended that it was entitled to be dismissed as a defendant on the ground 
that, as matter of law, it was not subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of Derek. 
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The only reason that Cheryl was not dismissed by summary judgment, was that the 
district court held that the jury was required to determine the factual question of whether 
Derek was a volunteer. In filing the 54(b) Motion, Cheryl relied on the jury's decision 
which made the exact finding Cheryl had sought in the summary judgment motion, but 
the denial of the 54(b) Motion meant that the trial court ignored the jury's finding, despite 
its summary judgment ruling that a finding Derek was a volunteer would be dispositive of 
all claims against Cheryl. 
The importance of a finding by the jury that Derek was a volunteer is best 
demonstrated by the fact that Cheryl gave extraordinary emphasis to Interrogatory No. 6 
by making it the first argument in closing argument to the jury. Beginning in the second 
sentence and continuing through the sixth sentence, Cheryl specifically argued to the jury 
that Cheryl cannot be sued by Guss if Derek was not assisting Guss as a job, but as a 
volunteer. Similarly, Cheryl asked numerous witnesses at trial whether there was any 
evidence that Derek was an employee, including Guss, and none of them offered any 
testimony to support Guss's claim that Derek was an employee. 
In Argument I of the Appellee's Brief, Guss asserts that Cheryl's appeal is 
disingenuous and, in support of the assertion, she recites closing argument by Cheryl 
where counsel argued that, if the jury decided damages should be awarded, negligence 
should be allocated to the two parties and the non-party listed on the Special Verdict. 
Cheryl concedes that it did not object to the jury instructions and Special Verdict which 
provided that negligence would be apportioned to the two parties and the non-party. This 
apportionment was essential in the event that the jury found that Derek was an employee 
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of Cheryl, since Cheryl would have been vicariously liable for Derek's negligence. By 
contrast, the apportionment had no legal effect once the jury found that Derek was a 
volunteer. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to disregard and 
nullify Interrogatory No. 6 and give effect to the jury's finding by entry of summary 
judgment dismissing Guss's vicarious liability claims against Cheryl. 
B. GUSS HAS NOT ALLEGED ANY FACTS OR LAW THAT 
SUBJECT CHERYL TO LIABILITY FOR DEREK'S ASSISTANCE 
OF GUSS AS A VOLUNTEER. 
In Argument II of Appellee's Brief, Guss argues that it provided sufficient notice 
of her claims against Cheryl for claims of independent negligence. Cheryl disagrees that, 
even if Guss pled a claim for independent negligence, she was entitled to proceed to trial 
on an independent negligence cause of action, after the trial court denied summary 
judgment by ruling that the sole fact question to be decided concerning Cheryl's liability 
was whether Derek was a volunteer. Nevertheless, nowhere in Appellee's Brief does 
Guss discuss any legal principles that would subject Cheryl to liability for the negligent 
acts of a volunteer. Guss cites arguments made in opposing Cheryl's summary judgment 
motion that Derek had been improperly trained or that a business which asks an 
employee, family member, or bystander to assist a customer cannot deny any 
responsibility for a negative outcome. There is, however, no citation to any authority that 
a party which requests that a non-employee assist a customer into her car subjects the 
requester to liability for failure to train the volunteer. Moreover, Guss has not recited any 
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evidence showing that Cheryl was assisting Derek when he lifted Guss at the time she 
was injured. 
Under Utah law, a volunteer cannot subject an employer to vicarious liability. 
E.g., Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996) (an employer cannot 
be held vicariously liable for the torts of a volunteer). If a so-called employer was not 
assisting a volunteer at the time the volunteer injured a customer while the customer was 
being transferred into her car, the employer cannot be liable. 
In seeking summary judgment, Cheryl cited authority which provided that a party 
may be subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of an actor "who voluntarily aids 
another" under the multiple elements recited in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323. 
E.g., Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 21 P.3d 667 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Guss did not, however, request any jury instructions or Special Verdict interrogatories 
pertaining to this doctrine and, in denying summary judgment, the trial court did not 
order that Guss was entitled to proceed to trial under this theory. Guss cannot seek 
recovery under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 where the jury did not receive 
instructions concerning the elements of the claim and these elements were not proven at 
trial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (issues not raised by pleadings shall be treated as though 
they had been tried, but only if they were tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties). 
In summary, the fact that Cheryl requested that Derek assist Guss does not subject 
Cheryl to liability, unless Derek was Cheryl's employee. 
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C GUSS HAD THE OBLIGATION TO SUBMIT JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND A SPECIAL VERDICT TO EXPLAIN THE 
EFFECT OF INTERROGATORY NO. 6. 
In Argument II of the Appellee's Brief, Guss complains that Cheryl did not object 
to the omission of a legal explanation of Interrogatory No. 6 in the jury instructions or 
Special Verdict form. Of course, as Guss concedes in her Brief, it would be absurd for 
Cheryl to object to Interrogatory No. 6, because Cheryl submitted the jury instructions 
and Special Verdict form. Cheryl did not consider it necessary to submit any further 
definition of terms with plain meanings like "employee" and "volunteer." Cheryl does 
not agree that the jury instructions or Special Verdict required a definition of "vicarious 
liability" or that Cheryl had an obligation to describe the effect of Interrogatory No. 6. If 
Guss contends the jury instructions and Special Verdict were incomplete, she should have 
objected to them, but she did not. 
In accordance with the trial court's order denying summary judgment, a jury 
verdict finding that Derek was a volunteer would necessarily require dismissal of Guss's 
claims against Cheryl. Thus, Guss was entitled to submit an explanatory jury instruction 
or, perhaps, a statement in the Special Verdict, describing the dispositive effect of 
Interrogatory No. 6. Analogous authority for Guss to provide a jury instruction 
explaining the effect of Interrogatory No. 6 was provided by the comparative fault 
instruction submitted to the jury. In particular, Instruction No. 17 was given to the jury 
by the trial court to instruct the jury that, if the jury allocated 50% or more of the total 
fault of all parties listed on the verdict form to Guss, "then Guss would recover nothing." 
Instruction No. 17 is identical to a model Utah jury instruction, but there is no reason that 
922739 1 9 
Guss could not have provided a similar warning of the effect of Interrogatory No. 6, if 
Derek was found to be a volunteer. Guss did not submit any additional instructions or 
object to Interrogatory No. 6. 
Although Guss contends that Cheryl failed to object to the trial court's failure to 
give jury instructions necessary to explain Interrogatory No. 6, it was Guss's obligation 
to object to any incomplete jury instructions. 
D. GUSS HAS NOT OFFERED A REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF 
HOW THE TRIAL COURT GAVE EFFECT TO 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND, 
THEREFORE, CHERYL WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL. 
In Argument III of Appellee's Brief, Guss disputes that Cheryl is entitled to 
reversal of the judgment, or a new trial, for the district court's failure to give effect to 
Interrogatory No. 6. Specifically, Guss argues that the Special Verdict was not 
inconsistent and, if it was, Cheryl failed to preserve its right to seek reversal of the 54(b) 
Motion or a new trial. Guss has not, however, made any effort in her Brief to offer a 
reasonable explanation for how the trial court gave effect to Interrogatory No. 6. At the 
end of Argument III, Guss's only discussion of the reason the trial court failed to consider 
Interrogatory No. 6 in the entry of judgment was that "[t]he only consequence of this 
response is that Cheryl is only responsible for the negligence attributed her, and is not 
responsible for any negligence attributed to Derek. Ms. Guss didn't object to this 
question because it would not bar her recovery, but would clarify whether Cheryl was 
only responsible for her actions/negligence or whether she would be responsible for 
Derek as well." This argument does not make sense, because Derek settled a week 
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before trial and was a non-party. Accordingly, upon finding Derek to be a volunteer, 
there was no conceivable way that Cheryl could be liable for any negligence attributed to 
Derek. Indeed, the effect of Derek's settlement with Guss was that the 20% in 
negligence attributed to Derek in the Special Verdict reduced Guss's recovery of 
damages by 20% in the final judgment. 
Based on the trial court's order denying summary judgment, Cheryl requested 
Interrogatory No. 6 in the Special Verdict, examined numerous witnesses concerning the 
evidence showing that Derek was not an employee, and devoted the most important part 
of the closing argument to Interrogatory No. 6. The denial of the 54(b) Motion, however, 
meant that the judgment entered against Cheryl was not different in any way, because 
Derek was found to be a volunteer and not an employee. The district court decided that 
Interrogatory No. 6 should be completely disregarded and nullified by entering judgment 
against Cheryl. There is no way to know why the District Court submitted Interrogatory 
No. 6 to the jury, if it intended to enter the same judgment against Cheryl, regardless of 
whether Derek was found to be an employee or volunteer. 
After the jury found that Derek was a volunteer in Interrogatory No. 6, Cheryl 
justifiably expected the district court to give equal effect to all of the findings in the 
Special Verdict by dismissing Guss's claims consistent with its order denying summary 
judgment. If the trial court had granted the 54(b) motion, Interrogatory No. 6 would have 
been harmonious with other interrogatories and all seven interrogatories would have had 
equal priority. E.g., Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 
1981) (a jury's answers to special interrogatories must be read harmoniously); Heno v. 
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Sprint/United Management Co., 208 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir. 2000) (there is no priority of 
one jury answer over another). Only when the district court denied the 54(b) motion by 
failing to give meaning and effect to Interrogatory No. 6 was there a reason for Cheryl to 
object to the Special Verdict. In other words, at the trial, Cheryl did not object to the 
Special Verdict, since the trial court had not defeated the effect of the finding in 
Interrogatory No. 6. See First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 
P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) (in rendering judgment for plaintiff, the trial court does not 
have the prerogative to defeat the effect of a jury's findings that are favorable to 
defendants); Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 
1979) (the trial court did not have the prerogative to disregard or nullify a jury's findings 
favorable to the defendant). 
Cheryl should not be barred from seeking reversal of the order denying the 54(b) 
Motion, or a new trial, for the failure to object to the Special Verdict at trial, where 
Cheryl did not know the district court would fail to give effect to Interrogatory No. 6, 
until the 54(b) motion was denied. If the trial court did not intend to give effect to a jury 
finding that Derek was a volunteer, it should have removed Interrogatory No. 6 from the 
Special Verdict. The district court's decision to include Interrogatory No. 6 in the 
Special Verdict meant that once Cheryl obtained a favorable finding that Derek was a 
volunteer, the trial court did not have the prerogative to disregard and nullify the finding. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remedy the failure of the trial court to give any meaning and 
effect to the jury's finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a volunteer. Therefore, 
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Cheryl respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying the 
54(b) Motion or, alternatively, order a new trial. 
DATED this ' day of March, 2010. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By. ^ 
ivAngus Edwards 
Jessica P. Wilde 
Attorneys for Defendant, Cheryl, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ 4 _ day of March, 2010,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
William R. Rawlings 
11576 South State Street, Suite 401 
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